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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I. IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
In Yarborough & Co. v. Schoolfield Furniture Industries,
Inc.,1 creditors of a domestic corporation wholly owned by a for-
eign corporation brought suit against the foreign parent on the
debts of the subsidiary. The South Carolina Supreme Court re-
fused to sanction the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over
the foreign corporation, holding that "the mere acquisition and
control of a domestic subsidiary's capital stock does not subject
the foreign parent to the jurisdiction of [this] State's courts."2
Schoolfield Furniture Industries, Inc., a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of Hickory Furniture Company,3 operated a furniture
plant in South Carolina. In a suit against Hickory, Schoolfield's
unsecured creditors effected personal service of process on Hick-
ory in North Carolina pursuant to sections 36-2-8034 and 33-23-
1. - S.C. -, 268 S.E.2d 42 (1980).
2. Id. at -, 268 S.E.2d at 44.
3. Hickory Furniture Company is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in North Carolina.
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803 (1976) provides:
(1) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts di-
rectly or by an agent as to a cause of action arising from the person's
(a) transacting any business in this State;
(b) contracting to supply services or things in the State;
(c) commission of a tortious act in whole or in part in this State;
(d) causing tortious injury or death in this State by an act or omission
outside this State if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any
other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods
used or consumed or services rendered, in this State; or
(e) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this State;
or
(f) contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this
State at the time of contracting; or
(g) entry into a contract to be performed in whole or in part by either
party in this State; or
(h) production, manufacture, or distribution of goods with the reasonable
expectation that those goods are to be used or consumed in this State and are
so used or consumed.
(2) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section,
only a cause of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be
asserted against him, and such action, if brought in this State, shall not be
1
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140(d) 5 of the South Carolina Code. When Hickory appeared
specially and moved to quash service for lack of in personam
jurisdiction, Schoolfield's creditors responded with affidavits
purporting to establish that Hickory had sufficient minimum
contacts in South Carolina to subject the corporation to jurisdic-
tion. The trial court denied Hickory's motion to quash, finding
that Schoolfield's use of purchase orders identifying the corpora-
tion as a subsidiary of Hickory constituted a "special effort" to
advise others that Hickory was the parent of Schoolfield and
placed Hickory within the jurisdiction of South Carolina's
courts.6
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court first ruled
that the creditors' affidavits should have been excluded from the
trial court's consideration because they were "conclusory in na-
ture and based almost entirely on hearsay."'7 The court then
concluded that the three grounds on which Schoolfield's credi-
tors based their claim for jurisdiction-Hickory's contract in
South Carolina to purchase Schoolfield's stock, Schoolfield's
public identification as Hickory's subsidiary, and the two corpo-
rations' common officers and directors--were insufficient to es-
tablish jurisdiction. Finally, relying on the rule established by
Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,9 a United
States Supreme Court decision, and its progeny,10 the South
Carolina court held that mere acquisition and control of a do-
mestic subsidiary's capital stock does not subject the foreign
parent to in personam jurisdiction."1
In Cannon, the plaintiff, a North Carolina corporation,
brought a breach of contract action against Cudahy Packing
Company, a Maine corporation that marketed products in North
subject to the provisions of § 15-7-100(3).
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-23-140(d) provides that service may be effected by delivery
of a copy of the process to any foreign corporation outside the state.
6. Record at 5.
7. - S.C. at -, 268 S.E.2d at 43.
8. Id. at -, 268 S.E.2d at 43.
9. 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
10. In addition to Cannon, the court relied on Mid-Continent Tel Corp. v. Home
Tel. Co., 307 F. Supp. 1014 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Hermetic Seal Corp. v. Savoy Elecs., Inc.,
290 F. Supp. 240 (S.D. Fla. 1967), afl'd, 401 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1968); Scalise v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 276 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1967); LaVarre v. Int'l Paper Co., 37 F.2d 141
(E.D.S.C. 1929).
11. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 33
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Carolina through its wholly owned subsidiary, Cudahy Packing
Company of Alabama. Service of process was effected on the
subsidiary. Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, determined
that the issue was "whether, at the time of the service of pro-
cess, defendant was doing business within the State in such a
manner and to such an extent as to warrant the inference that it
was present there."12 The Court observed: "The corporate sepa-
ration, though perhaps merely formal, was real. It was not pure
fiction." I s Because of the maintenance of formal separateness,
the Court affirmed dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Although the "Cannon rule" has been followed by a South
Carolina district court 4 and by the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, the latter court occasionally has observed the
rule with reluctance. 5 Moreover, other courts have employed a
variety of methods"6 to circumvent the "Cannon rule" and find
jurisdiction over a foreign parent of a domestic subsidiary.
Where related corporations have failed to maintain the degree of
formal separateness found sufficient in Cannon and where the
parent has controlled and dominated the internal affairs of the
subsidiary, some courts have allowed jurisdiction over the par-
ent. 1 7 Similarly, courts have found jurisdiction where the parent
12. 267 U.S. at 334-35 (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 337.
14. LaVarre v. Int'l Paper Co., 37 F.2d 141 (E.D.S.C. 1929).
15. See, e.g., Harris v. Deere & Co., 223 F.2d 161, 163 (4th Cir. 1965)("The fiction of
different corporate entities ought not to permit the manufacturer, in such case, to avoid
suit .... It is not for us, however, to overrule or modify decisions of the Supreme Court
.... "); Manville Boiler Co. v. Columbia Boiler Co., 269 F.2d 600, 606 (4th Cir. 1959) ("If
the rule of [Cannon] unduly emphasizes the form... and minimizes the control ... ,
the rule, nevertheless, is well established .... As this Court observed. . ., we cannot
change or modify the rule. . . .") See also Rollins v. Proctor & Schwartz, 476 F. Supp.
1137 (D.S.C. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 634 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1980).
16. See, e.g., Comment, Jurisdiction Over Parent Corporations, 51 CALIF. L. REv.
574, 580 (1963), in which the author suggests the following ways by which courts may
circumvent the "Cannon rule": "(1) finding a failure to maintain formal intercorporate
separation; (2) finding an agency relationship between parent and subsidiary; and (3)
factually distinguishing Cannon on the relationship of the cause of action to the subsidi-
ary and the forum." In 39 BROOKLYN L. RaV. 229, 234 (1972), the author suggests three
fact situations appropriate for circumvention of the rule: (1) those in which the parent-
subsidiary relation is a complete sham, (2) those in which a principal-agent relationship
exists, and (3) those in which the parent and subsidiary hold themselves out as a single
entity. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFicT OF LAWS § 52, Comment b (1971).
17. E.g., ACS Indus., Inc. v. Keller Indus., 296 F. Supp. 1160 (D. Conn. 1969).
1981]
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has held out the subsidiary as its agent."8 In some cases, jurisdic-
tion has been exercised over the foreign parent even though for-
mal separateness has been maintained, especially where the
court has considered the commercial reality of the relationship.'9
Furthermore, when a dealer-distributor or a franchisor-fran-
chisee relationship exists in which the foreign dealer or
franchisor, by written agreement, dominates and controls all as-
pects of the business, the foreign corporation often is susceptible
to service of process. 20 Nevertheless, despite criticism of the
"Cannon rule" and attempts to circumvent it or to read it nar-
rowly, the maintenance of formal separateness or the lack of
dominant control of the subsidiary by the parent will be suffi-
cient to bar the exercise of in personam jurisdiction in many
instances.
The value of Cannon has eroded considerably.22 Many
courts and commentators 23 have criticized the decision or have
assigned it minimal weight. Today, the concept of presence de-
veloped in Cannon has been replaced by the standard, enunci-
ated by the United States Supreme Court in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington,24 that the corporation must have certain
"minimum contacts... such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
18. E.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Cassel, 302 F.2d 132 (10th Cir. 1962).
19. E.g., Boyrk v. DeHavilland Aircraft Co., 341 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965).
20. See, e.g., Scalise v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 276 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Szan-
tay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 237 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Szaptay v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 237 F. Supp. 393 (E.D.S.C. 1965), afl'd, 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965).
21. See note 10 and accompanying text supra. In addition, see McPheron v. Penn.
Cent. Transp. Co., 390 F. Supp. 943 (D. Conn. 1975); American Compressed Steel Corp.
v. Pettibone Mulliken Corp., 271 F. Supp. 864 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
22. E.g., Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483 (D. Kan.
1978). See note 15 supra.
23. E.g., Cardozo, A New Footnote in Erie v. Tompkins: "Cannon Is Overruled," 36
N.C.L. REv. 181 (1958); Wellborn, Subsidiary Corporations in New York: When Is Mere
Ownership Enough to Establish Jurisdiction over the Parent, 22 ButFALo L. Rlv. 681,
683-85 (1973); Comment, Jurisdiction Over Parent Corporations, 51 CALi. L. REv. 574
(1963); Note, Civil Procedure-Personal Jurisdiction-Alter Ego Doctrine Employed to
Support Personal Jurisdiction Over a Foreign Subsidiary Corporation Based on the
Acts of the Parent Corporation in the Forum State, 25 KAN. L. REv. 109, 118-25 (1976);
Note, Subsidiary Conduct as a Basis for Long-Arm Jurisdiction over a Parent Corpora-
tion in Vermont, 3 VT. L. REv. 111, 118-20 (1978); 39 BROOKLYN L. REv., 229, 233-37
(1972).
24. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
[Vol. 3
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justice.' ''25 Recently, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson,2 6 the Court focused on the defendant's contacts with
the forum in terms of the amount of sales, the number of offi-
cers, the presence of an agent, and the degree of
advertisement.
2 7
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that
"this state's service of process laws and the jurisdiction of its
courts [extend] to the outer limits allowable under the due pro-
cess requirements of the International Shoe Company case," 28 it
nevertheless has recognized that the extension of in personam
jurisdiction is not unlimited. In Boney v. Trans-State Dredging
Co.,2 9 the South Carolina court identified the following consider-
ations for determining the availability of jurisdiction: "the dura-
tion of the corporate activity in the state of the forum; the char-
acter of the acts giving rise to the suit, and the circumstances of
their commission; and the balancing of the inconvenience to the
parties .... "30 The court was careful to observe, however, that
the identification of criteria "cannot be simply mechanical or
quantitative,"31 and that concern with "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice" remains paramount.2
The South Carolina Supreme Court's adoption of the "Can-
non rule" in Yarborough is potentially troublesome. The court
noted the "minimum contacts" test for in personam jurisdiction,
first enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Interna-
tional Shoe and subsequently applied in South Carolina, but in
holding that a foreign corporation's acquisition and control of a
domestic subsidiary's capital stock does not subject the foreign
parent to in personam jurisdiction in South Carolina, the court
adopted a rule based on the outdated "corporate presence" test.
The court applied the rule to find that Hickory lacked sufficient
25. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). The defendant's
act must also purposefully avail the defendant of the privilege of conducting activities
within the state. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). Further, Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 212-13 (1977), requires that all assertions of state court jurisdiction must
be evaluated according to standards established in International Shoe and its progeny.
26. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
27. Id. at 295.
28. Triplett v. R.M. Wade & Co., 261 S.C. 419, 427-28, 200 S.E.2d 375, 379 (1973).
29. 237 S.C. 54, 115 S.E.2d 508 (1960).
30. Id. at 62, 115 S.E.2d at 512.
31. Id. (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
32. See id. at 60, 115 S.E.2d at 512. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
1981]
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contacts with South Carolina. While this result is reasonable on
the facts before the court in Yarborough, it is foreseeable that
the court may be confronted with an attempt to exercise juris-
diction over a foreign parent corporation having more significant
contacts with the state. Should that occur, the court will be
forced either to deny exercise of in personam jurisdiction
through a blind application of the "Cannon rule" or to create an
exception to the rule that allows recognition of significant con-
tacts and permits the exercise of jurisdiction.
II. SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF PROCESS
Section 33-5-60(b) of the South Carolina Code provides that
whenever the registered agent of a domestic corporation cannot
be found at the corporation's registered office, service of process
can be effected upon the Secretary of State. The statute further
provides that substituted service is not returnable in fewer than
thirty days.33 Section 15-9-20, which sets forth the requisites for
summonses, requires a defendant upon whom process has been
served to answer within twenty days of service. 4 In Newberry
County Water and Sewer Authority v. Welco Construction and
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-5-60 (1976) provides:
(a) The registered agent appointed by any domestic corporation shall be
the agent of such corporation for service of any process, notice, or demand
required or permitted by law to be served, and such service shall be binding
upon the corporation.
(b) Whenever a corporation shall fail to appoint or maintain a registered
agent in this State, or whenever its registered agent cannot with reasonable
diligence be found at the registered office, then the Secretary of State shall be
an agent of such corporation upon whom any such process, notice, or demand
may be served. Service on the Secretary of State of any such process, notice, or
demand shall be made by delivering to and leaving with him, or with any per-
son or persons designated by him to receive such service, duplicate copies of
such process, notice, or demand. In the event any such process, notice, or de-
mand is served on the Secretary of State, he shall immediately forward one of
the copies thereof by registered mail, addressed to the corporation at its regis-
tered office. Any service so had on the Secretary of State shall be returnable in
not less than thirty days.
(c) The Secretary of State shall keep a record of all processes, notices
and demands served upon him under this section, and shall record therein the
time of such service and his action with reference thereto.
(d) Nothing herein contained shall limit or impair the right to serve any
process, notice, or demand required or permitted by law to be served upon a
corporation in any other manner now or hereafter permitted by law.
34. See note 39 infra.
6
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Utilities Co.,35 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that,
notwithstanding section 15-9-20, section 33-5-60(b) prohibits a
plaintiff from requiring responsive pleadings fewer than thirty
days from the date of substituted service upon the Secretary of
State. The court further ruled that when substituted service has
been effected a summons requiring a response in fewer than
thirty days is fatally and jurisdictionally defective. 8
Newberry County Water and Sewer Authority commenced
suit against Welco Construction and Utilities Company by sub-
stituted service upon the Secretary of State because Welco's lo-
cal office was closed and the corporation had gone out of busi-
ness. 37 Plaintiff also sent a courtesy copy of the pleadings to
Welco's counsel.3 8 The summons complied with the statutory
pleading provisions of the South Carolina Codes9 and required
an answer within twenty days. 0 Welco appeared specially to
challenge jurisdiction,"4 and the trial court dismissed the pro-
ceeding on the ground that the summons was jurisdictionally de-
35. - S.C. , 266 S.E.2d 875 (1980).
36. Id. at __, 266 S.E.2d at 876.
37. Id. at ., 266 S.E.2d at 875-76.
38. Id. Before this action, the same controversy was pending in the United States
District Court as a diversity action in which United States Fidelity and Guaranty Com-
pany was the plaintiff with Newberry Water and Welco as defendants. On the motion of
Newberry Water, the district court realigned the parties and dismissed the action be-
cause diversity was destroyed. The present action was initiated on December 15, 1978.
After substituted service the same day, one copy of the summons and complaint was
mailed by the Secretary of State and returned by the post office marked "moved not
forwardable." On December 18, 1978, counsel for Welco was given a courtesy copy.
Welco, never having received service, did not answer. On January 29, 1979, counsel
for Welco contacted counsel for Newberry Water to determine why Welco had not been
served. Counsel for Newberry Water replied that Welco had been served through the
Secretary of State and was in default. Upon considering whether to allow Welco to an-
swer or to stand on alleged default, plaintiffs attorney advised Welco that it would not
be allowed to answer. On the same day, Welco made a special appearance challenging
jurisdiction. Record at 1-3.
39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-20 (1976) provides:
The summons shall be subscribed by the plaintiff or his attorney and di-
rected to the defendant. It shall require the defendant to answer the complaint
and serve a copy of his answer on the person whose name is subscribed to the
summons at a place within the State, to be therein specified, in which there is
a post office, within twenty days after the service of the summons, exclusive of
the day of service.
40. Record at 4.
41. A general appearance would have constituted waiver of any defect or irregularity
in service of process. E.g., Strickland v. Consolidated Energy Prods. Co., - S.C. -, 265
S.E.2d 682 (1980); Connell v. Connell, 249 S.C. 162, 153 S.E.2d 396 (1967).
7
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fective because it required the defendant to respond in less time
than prescribed by statute."2
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the
trial court's ruling that a summons served by substituted service
and requiring a response in fewer than thirty days is jurisdic-
tionally defective.43 It rejected Newberry County Water and
Sewer Authority's argument that the phrase "returnable in not
less than thirty days" referred to return of proof of service44 and
concluded that the statute purposely did not require a response
in fewer than thirty days in order to allow additional time to a
corporate defendant upon whom substituted service has been
effected.45
An examination of decisions in other jurisdictions reveals a
split of authority on the issue of fatal defect.46 Many courts have
decided that a summons requiring an earlier return than that
prescribed by statute is jurisdictionally defective.47 Other courts,
however, have held that such a summons is merely irregular and
42. Record at 36.
43. The court's review of prior case law indicated that in similar situations other
summonses had been found jurisdictionally defective. For example, magistrates' sum-
monses requiring an appearance in less time than that prescribed by statute had been
found inadequate to confer personal jurisdiction. Paul v. Southern Ry. Co., 50 S.C. 23, 27
S.E. 526 (1897); Adkins v. Moore, 43 S.C. 173, 20 S.E. 985 (1895); see S.C. CODE ANN. §
22-3-120 (1976). Also, an order to show cause has been found fatally defective because it
required a defendant to answer in less than the twenty-day statutory period. State ex
rel. Lindsey v. Tollison, 95 S.C. 58, 78 S.E. 521 (1913).
Chief Justice Lewis, in his dissent, disagreed with the majority's reasoning, taking
the position that the substituted service provision increased the time for answering to
thirty days but did not require an express statement in the suntmons to that effect in
order for it to be jurisdictionally sufficient. - S.C. at -, 266 S.E.2d at 877 (Lewis, C.J.,
dissenting).
44. While the phrase was not discussed directly, the Reporter's Notes indicate that
the "net effect [of § 33-5-60(b)] is to increase the number of persons upon whom process
may be served, and thus almost wholly eliminate a corporation's evading service of pro-
cess." JOINT COMM. OF THE GEN. ASSEMBLY TO INVESTIGATE THE FEASIBILITY OF REVISING
THE LAWS RELATING TO CORPS. & SEcs., DRAFT VERSION: SOUTH CAROLINA BUSINESS COR-,
PORATION AcT OF 1962, at 25 (1961).
45. - S.C. at .- , 266 S.E.2d at 876.
46. See Annot., 97 A.L.R. 746, 748-49 (1935); Annot., 6 A.L.R. 841, 843-45 (1920).
47. E.g., Greene v. Municipal Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 446, 124 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1975);
Schoffel v. Goodstein, 107 Misc. 695, 177 N.Y.S. 844 (Bronx County Ct. 1919); Tucci v.
Romeo, 94 Misc. 317, 158 N.Y.S. 262 (App. Term 1916); Aggers v. Bridges, 31 Okla. 617,
122 P. 170 (1912); Nicodemus v. Farley, 16 Pa. D. & C. 547 (1931); Martin v. Nelson, 533
P.2d 897 (Utah 1975); Emery v. Emery, 404 P.2d 745 (Wyo. 1965); National Supply Co.
v. Chittim, 387 P.2d 1010 (Wyo. 1964); Vanover v. Vanover, 77 Wyo. 55, 307 P.2d 117
(1957).
8
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amendable48 or that the error is not fatal where the defendant
was not deceived or misled to his detriment or prejudice.4 9
Newberry provided an excellent opportunity for the South
Carolina Supreme Court to interpret section 33-5-60, the substi-
tuted service provision, and to resolve any conflict between it
and section 15-9-2050 without causing any apparent harm to the
parties.5 1 Nevertheless, application of this decision in some in-
stances may produce harsh results. Plaintiffs intending to serve
by substituted service pursuant to section 33-5-60 are now on
notice to set a time for response in excess of thirty days.
HI. VENUE
A. Owning Property and Transacting Business
In South Carolina, venue for actions in which a corporation
is one of several defendants may be determined pursuant to ei-
ther of two statutes. Section 15-7-30 of the South Carolina Code
provides that an action with multiple defendants will be tried in
the county where one of the defendants resides.52 Section 15-9-
48. E.g., Lockway v. Modern Woodmen of America, 116 Minn. 115, 133 N.W. 398
(1911); Barker Co. v. Central West Inv. Co., 75 Neb. 43, 105 N.W. 985 (1905); Elder v.
Morse, 214 A.D. 632, 212 N.Y.S. 581 (1925).
49. E.g., Widmer v. Wood, 244 Ark. 307, 425 S.W.2d 514 (1965); United Order of
Good Samaritans v. Brooks, 168 Ark. 570, 270 S.W. 955 (1925); Krueger v. Lynch, 242
Iowa 772, 48 N.W.2d 266 (1951); Continental Ins. Co. v. Norman, 71 Okla. 146, 176 P.
211 (1918).
50. See note 39 supra.
51. In finding the summons jurisdictionally defective in this case, the court pre-
vented a default when the defendants had never been served, even though the plaintiff
most likely was aware of their present address. During the course of the federal court
action, counsel for the appellant on two separate occasions took the deposition of the
officers and sole stockholders in the respondent corporation. One of the officers also was
the registered agent for service of process. Record at 1. During the course of these depo-
sitions, the appellant learned that Welco no longer was doing business in Sumter, South
Carolina, and that these two men presently were living in Florence, South Carolina. Brief
of Respondent at 1; Record at 18-19, 25-26, 29.
52. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-30 (1976) provides:
In all other cases the action shall be tried in the county in which the de-
fendant resides at the time of the commencement of the action. If there be
more than one defendant then the action may be tried in any county in which
one or more of the defendants to such action resides at the time of the com-
mencement of the action. If none of the parties shall reside in the State the
action may be tried in any county which the plaintiff shall designate in his
complaint. This section is subject however to the power of the court to change
the place of trial in certain cases as provided by law.
9
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210 places venue in an action to which a corporation is a party
in any county where the corporation owns property and trans-
acts business. 53 In In re Asbestosis Cases,54 the South Carolina
Supreme Court construed the two venue statutes together and
held that residence, for purposes of venue, includes those coun-
ties in which any corporate defendant owns property and trans-
acts business 55 at the time the suit is commenced. 56 The court
further held that a corporate defendant's substantial contract
rights in a forum constitute the requisite property ownership.
57
In re Asbestosis Cases resulted from the pretrial consolida-
tion of a number of products liability suits. With the exception
of defendant Covil Corporation, .whose only place of business
was Greenville, South Carolina,58 all defendants were foreign
corporations. Suit was commenced in Barnwell County, and
Covil moved for a change of venue to Greenville, but its motion
was denied.59 On appeal, Covil argued that section 15-7-30 was
"exclusively applicable in all cases involving multiple defen-
dants" and that venue, therefore, should be limited to those
counties where the domestic corporation maintained its princi-
pal place of business, an office, or an agent for the transaction of
business.8 0 The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected this ar-
gument and affirmed the right of foreign corporate defendants,
pursuant to section 15-9-210, to venue in a forum where they
transacted business and owned property. The court then con-
53. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-210 (1976) provides:
If the suit be against a corporation, the summons shall, except as other-
wise expressly provided, be served by delivering a copy thereof to the president
or other head of the corporation, or to the secretary, cashier or treasurer or any
director or agent thereof; provided, further, that, in the case of domestic or
foreign corporations, service as effected under the terms of this section shall be
effective and confer jurisdiction over any domestic or foreign corporation in
any county where such domestic or foreign corporation shall own property and
transact business, regardless of whether or not such domestic or foreign corpo-
ration maintains an office or has agents in that county.
54. - S.C. -, 266 S.E.2d 773 (1980).
55. Id. at -, 266 S.E.2d at 775.
56. Id. at -, 266 S.E.2d at 776 (citing Lott v. Claussens, Inc., 251 S.C. 478, 163
S.E.2d 615 (1968) and Burris Chem., Inc. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 251 S.C. 483, 163 S.E.2d
618 (1968)).
57. Id. at -, 266 S.E.2d at 777.
58. Id. at , 266 S.E.2d at 777.
59. Id. at -, 266 S.E.2d at 777.
60. Id. at , 266 S.E.2d at 775.
[Vol. 33
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cluded that the two statutes, sections 15-7-30 and 15-9-210,
should be construed together and that the residence provision of
section 15-7-30 includes, for purposes of determining venue,
those counties in which any corporate defendant owned property
and transacted business, as provided in section 15-9-210.61 As a
result of this conclusion, venue in an action with multiple corpo-
rate defendants is proper in any forum in which one of them
owns property and transacts business.
6 2
The court next determined that a corporate defendant must
satisfy the test for property ownership at the time the suit is
commenced rather than at the time the cause of action accrues.63
Because Covil did not own property or transact business in
Barnwell County at the time the action was commenced, plain-
tiffs alleged that the activities of North Brothers, Inc., a foreign
corporate defendant, were sufficient to confer venue in Barnwell
County.64 Although no evidence showed that North Brothers
owned tangible personal property in Barnwell County, plaintiffs
urged that the corporation owned intangible property in the
form of contract rights resulting from an agreement with the
DuPont Savannah River Plant in Barnwell County,65 and, in so
doing, presented the court with the question of whether the al-
leged contract rights constituted a sufficient basis for venue in
Barnwell County.
While the court had recognized in previous decisions that
contract rights can be considered property rights for determin-
ing questions of venue,66 it had not established a minimum stan-
dard of sufficiency against which contracts might be measured.
The court has ruled, however, that, to constitute "transacting
business" for purposes of venue, a corporation must have con-
ducted continuous business, amounting to more than "mere cas-
ual, occasional, or isolated transactions. '67 From these earlier
61. Id. at -, 266 S.E.2d at 775.
62. In cases with multiple defendants, venue is proper in any county in which at
least one defendant resides. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-30 (1976).
63. ._S.C. at -, 266 S.E.2d at 775.
64. Id. at -, 266 S.E.2d at 776.
65. Id. at -, 266 S.E.2d at 776.
66. See Peeples v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 244 S.C. 173, 135 S.E.2d 845 (1964)
(termite inspection contracts); Gibbes v. National Hosp. Serv., Inc., 202 S.C. 304, 24
S.E.2d 513 (1943)(insurance contracts).
67. Atkinson v. Korn Indus., Inc., 219 S.C. 402, 406, 65 S.E.2d 465, 466 (1951).
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determinations, the court in In re Asbestosis Cases concluded
that "the property owned in a given county necessary to hold
venue proper in that county should be substantial in nature, es-
pecially where the property is intangible. ' 6' Therefore, a con-
tract upon which venue can be predicated must be substantial in
nature.
Having established the requirement that a contract used as
a basis for venue must be substantial in nature and having indi-
cated that such considerations as the size and duration of the
contract and the nature of the work performed are relevant in
determining the materiality of a contract, the court, in In re As-
bestosis Cases, was unable to apply the standard because the
contract between North Brothers and DuPont had not been
made part of the record.69 Consequently, the decision offers no
insight into the amount of money with which a contract must be
concerned or the duration or type of contract that is necessary.
Furthermore, an examination of prior decisions fails to reveal a
consistent approach to the determination of whether contract
rights constitute property ownership.70 Therefore, while the
68. -S.C. at -, 266 S.E.2d at 777.
69. Id. at -, 266 S.E.2d at 777-78.
70. In earlier cases, the court focused on the transitory nature of the property; more
recently it has examined the relation between the property and the necessity of the busi-
ness. Moreover, in some cases the court has looked to the contracts involved but in other
cases has failed to mention them.
In Gibbes, for example, the court ruled that venue was proper in Aiken County be-
cause the defendant insurance company had insurance policies there that constituted
valuable property rights. Later, in Peeples, the court held that renewable contracts for
the extermination of termites and for inspection and repair were property within the
venue statute. See note 66 and accompanying text supra. Stressing the continuous na-
ture of the duties and obligations, the court in Gibbes and Peeples distinguished these
decisions from Brown v. Palmetto Baking Co., 220 S.C. 38, 66 S.E.2d 417 (1951), and
Hopkins v. Sun Crest Bottling Co., 228 S.C. 287, 89 S.E.2d 755 (1955), in which the
physical property was only temporarily in the county. In neither Brown nor Hopkins did
the court mention any contractual agreement. In Lott v. Claussens, Inc., 251 S.C. 478,
163 S.E.2d 615 (1968), the court relied on Gibbes and Peeples and found venue proper in
Barnwell County because, as a dues paying member of the South Carolina Bakers' Coun-
cil, Claussens had acquired a valuable and legally enforceable right to use bread display
racks and counters in stores in Barnwell County. The court noted that this right was
continuous and permanent in nature. Finally, in the recent decision of Mathis v. A.R.
Wood Corp., 272 S.C. 388, 252 S.E.2d 131 (1979), the defendant corporation had con-
tracts valued at approximately $190,000 to install water lines and a raw water pump
station. The property in question consisted of several pieces of equipment used on the
job. The court rejected the defendant's argument that venue was improper because the
equipment was transitory in nature and only temporarily in the county, stressing that
12
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court has set forth a standard against which contracts can be
measured for purposes of determining venue, the manner in
which the standard will be applied remains to be resolved.
B. Waiver of Right to Change Venue
In Landvest Associates v. Owens7 1 and Henley v. North
Trident Regional Hospital,7 2 the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina ruled that the actions of the defendants constituted waiver
of the right to demand change of venue to the county of defen-
dant's residence.
1. Landvest Associates v. Owens.-Landvest Associates
and Landvest H filed separate actions in Charleston County
against Owens. Plaintiffs alleged fraud and deceit under the
Limited Partnership Act7s and sought an accounting. Owens, a
resident of Beaufort County at the time the actions were com-
menced, "answered, counterclaimed, participated in extensive
discovery proceedings, successfully opposed plaintiffs' motions
for summary judgment, and moved that plaintiffs be required to
elect between their causes of action."7' Thereafter, Owens
moved for a change of venue to the county of his residence pur-
suant to section 15-7-30 of the South Carolina Code.7 5 The lower
court denied the motion on the ground that defendant had
waived his right to change venue.
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the lower court's or-
the mere fact that property is personal and movable is not controlling. Additionally, the
court found that the length of time the property is in a county is not significant; rather,
it ruled that it is necessary to examine the relationship between the property and the
necessities of business. In Mathis, because the equipment was necessary for the transac-
tion of defendant's business in Newberry County and, inferentially, was to be maintained
there as long as the defendant engaged in business in the county, the defendant's owner-
ship of the equipment met the sfatutory requirements to support venue in Newberry
County.
71. 274 S.C. 334, 263 S.E.2d 646 (1980).
72. - S.C. _, 269 S.E.2d 328 (1980).
73. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-110(1)(b). This section provides that a limited partner
has the right to "have on demand true and full information of all things affecting the
partnership, and a formal account of partnership affairs whenever circumstances render
it just and reasonable . .. ."
74. 274 S.C. at 335, 263 S.E.2d at 647.
75. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 15-7-30 (1976). This section provides that "the action shall be
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der/ reiterating that, while the right to be tried in the county of
one's residence is a subtantial and valuable right, it relates only
to the question of venue and can be waived.77 Although certain
procedural activities do not constitute waiver,78 the court re-
fused to place Owens' actions within the protected area.79 Focus-
ing particularly on the successful defense to the motions for
summary judgment, the court stressed that, had Owens not been
successful, summary judgment against him would have pre-
cluded his seeking a change of venue.80 Therefore, Owens' mo-
tion for change of venue "came too late."'
2. Henley v. North Trident Regional Hospital.-Henley
filed a medical malpractice action in Dorchester County against
the North Trident Regional Hospital. Five months later, after
answering the complaint and serving interrogatories on Henley,
the Hospital moved for a change of venue on the ground that it
was a resident of Charleston County.82 The lower court denied
the motion, finding that the Hospital had waived any right it
might have had to demand a trial in Charleston County.83
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed and held that, al-
though the simultaneous filing of an answer and interrogatories
alone might not be sufficient to establish waiver, the additional
element of failure to claim the right within a reasonable time
barred the Hospital's right to change of venue.8 The court's de-
termination that the Hospital had failed to make its claim
76. 274 S.C. at 335, 263 S.E.2d at 647.
77. Id. Accord, Triangle Auto Spring Co. v. Gromlovitz, 270 S.C. 386, 242 S.E.2d 430
(1978).
78. The filing of an answer does not constitute waiver. Witherspoon v. Spotts & Co.,
227 S.C. 209, 87 S.E.2d 477 (1955); Brown v. Palmetto Baking C6., 220 S.C. 38, 66 S.E.2d
417 (1951). The filing of a counterclaim along with the answer, in which the defendant
expressly reserves the right to move for change of venue, does not constitute waiver.
Harmon v. Graham, 247 S.C. 54, 145 S.E.2d 521 (1965).
79. 274 S.C. at 336, 263 S.E.2d at 648.
80. See Rosamond v. Lucas-Kidd Motor Co., 182 S.C. 331, 189 S.E. 641 (1937); Lil-
lard v. Searson, 170 S.C. 304, 170 S.E. 449 (1933).
81. 274 S.C. at 336, 263 S.E.2d at 648.
82. - S.C. at -, 269 S.E.2d at 328. The order of the lower court did not address
the issue of whether the Hospital was a resident of Dorchester County. The supreme
court stated that, for the purposes of the appeal, the location of the Hospital was unim-
portant because the Hospital had waived its right to change venue. Id. at - n.1, 269
S.E.2d at 328 n.1.
83. Id. at -, 269 S.E.2d at 328.
84. Id. at -, 269 S.E.2d at 329.
116 [Vol. 33
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within a reasonable time was based upon three considerations:
the Hospital had been granted an extension of time to answer;
its answer did not reserve the right to move for a change of
venue; and its motion for a change of venue was made five
months after service of the complaint and three months after
the Hospital's answer.8 5 Although the lower court had not em-
phasized the time element, the supreme court called attention to
"the inevitable delay brought about by failure of the hospital to
move promptly, 8 6 and refused to disturb the lower court's
ruling.
8 7
3. Conclusion.-Although a defendant does not waive the
right to request a change of venue merely by filing an answer,8 8 a
motion to change venue must be filed early in the action. Failure
to do so constitutes tacit agreement to the forum chosen by the
plaintiff. Landvest and Henley make it clear that, to avoid
waiver, the motion must be made before a defendant takes sub-
tantial procedural steps.
IV. DOOR-CLOSING STATUTE
Section 15-5-150 of the South Carolina Code opens South
Carolina's state courts to suits against foreign corporations only
if they are brought by a South Carolina resident or by a nonresi-
dent for a cause of action that arises within the state.89 In Proc-
tor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Rollins,90 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that this door-closing statute prevents a nonresi-
dent plaintiff from bringing an action in federal court in South
85. Id. at -, 269 S.E.2d at 329.
86. Id. at -, 269 S.E.2d at 329.
87. The supreme court can affirm on any ground appearing in the record. S.C. Sup.
CT. R. 4, § 8.
88. See note 78 supra.
89. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-150 (1976) provides:
An action against a corporation created by or under the laws of any other
state, government or country may be brought in the circuit court.
(1) By any resident of this State for any cause of action; or
(2) By a plaintiff not a resident of this State when the cause of action shall
have arisen or the subject of the action shall be situated within this State.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has ruled that the door-closing statute closes the
door of South Carolina's state courts to foreign causes of action brought by a nonresident
defendant against a foreign corporation. Nix v. Mercury Motor Express, Inc., 270 S.C.
477, 242 S.E.2d 683 (1978).
90. 634 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1980).
1981]
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Carolina against a foreign corporation when the state's statute of
limitations is the only reason for the choice of forum.91
Plaintiff in Rollins was a Georgia resident who had been in-
jured in a textile machinery accident in Georgia. Proctor &
Schwartz, a Pennsylvania corporation and wholly owned subsidi-
ary of SCM, a New York corporation, manufactured the alleg-
edly defective machine. Plaintiff first recovered workmen's com-
pensation under Georgia law and then brought a personal injury
action against Proctor & Schwartz and SCM in the United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina.92 Plain-
tiff filed the suit within South Carolina's six-year statute of limi-
tations 3 but after Georgia's two-year limitation period9 4 had
run. 5 The district court decided, inter alia, that the door-clos-
ing statute did not bar the action 6 and denied defendants' mo-
tion to dismiss97 but ruled that defendants had the right to im-
mediate appeal of the decision.98 The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed and held that South Carolina's door-
closing statute deprived the district court of subject matter
jurisdiction.9
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals previously had ad-
dressed the question of whether the door-closing statute re-
stricted the jurisidction of the federal courts, in South Carolina
in diversity cases in Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp.100 There
the court noted that "[flor many years it was generally under-
91. Id. at 740.
92. Id. at 739.
93. S.C. Con ANN. § 15-3-530(5)(Supp. 1980).
94. GA. CoDE ANN. § 3-1004 (1975).
95. 634 F.2d at 739.
96. Rollins v. Proctor & Schwartz, 478 F. Supp. 1137, 1152 (D.S.C. 1979).
97. Defendants' grounds for dismissal included lack of in personam jurisdiction, im-
proper venue, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Georgia's two-year statute of limi-
tations. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 2, Rollins v. Proc-
tor & Schwartz, 478 F. Supp. 1137 (D.S.C. 1979).
98. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
99. 634 F.2d at 740.
100. 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965). In Szantay, plaintiff's decedent purchased a Beech
aircraft in Nebraska and flew it to Florida. On the way to Chicago by way of Columbia,
South Carolina, plaintiff's decedent and his passengers were killed in a crash in Tennes-
see. Companion wrongful death actions were brought by representatives of the victims,
all citizens of Illinois, against Beech and Dixie Aviation Company, which had serviced
the plane in Columbia. Beech was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Kansas. Dixie was a South Carolina corporation.
[Vol. 33
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stood that federal jurisdiction was not affected by state statutes
limiting the jurisdiction of their own courts" 10 1 but that Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins1°2 and its progeny 03 had modified that absolute
approach. 04 The court concluded that, under the Erie doctrine,
a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction in South Carolina
must apply section 15-5-150 "absent affirmative countervailing
federal considerations."'105 The court identified three such con-
siderations: the goal of avoiding discrimination against nonresi-
dents in diversity actions, the goal of encouraging enforcement
of the laws of sister states, and the policy of providing efficient
joinder in multiparty actions.10  Because the court viewed these
considerations as explicit and substantial and considered the
state's reasons for enacting the door-closing statute to be "un-
certain," it refused to apply the statute. 01
Relying on the rationale of Szantay, the district court in
Rollins concluded that affirmative countervailing federal consid-
101. 349 F.2d at 63.
102. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
103. In Erie, the Supreme Court decided that, except in matters governed by the
United States Constitution or Acts of Congress, federal courts sitting in diversity must
apply state substantive law, decisional as well as statutory, in the adjudication of state-
created rights. Construing Erie in Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), the Court
noted that, in cases in which a federal court exercises diversity jurisdiction, the outcome
of the litigation in the federal court "should be substantially the same, so far as legal
rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court." Id.
at 109. The "outcome determinative" test was refined in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Coop. Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). In Byrd, the Court decided that a state procedural rule
must be applied by a federal court where it was bound up with the state-created rights
and obligations; however, if the rule were a mere form or mode of enforcing rights, its
application hinged on a broader inquiry. The federal court was required to conform to
the state rules, in the absence of other considerations, when they substantially affected
the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 536. Later, in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965),
the Court noted that the "outcome determinative" test had to be read with reference to
the "twin aims" of Erie: "discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequita-
ble administration of the laws." Id. at 468.
104. 349 F.2d at 63.
105. Id. at 64.
106. Id. at 65-66.
107. Id. The court, noting the lack of legislative history underlying the statute,
surmised that the statute might have been a formulation of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens or an attempt to relieve docket congestion. The court labeled as "attenuated"
the suggestion that the statute was designed to encourage foreign corporations to do
business in the state. The court concluded that the state's reason for enacting the statute
was "uncertain." Id. For a historical development of the prototype for § 15-5-150, Ch.
438, § 427, 1849, N.Y. LAws 697, see Lowenfield, Litigating a Sovereign Immunity
Claim-The Haita Case, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 377, 401-05 (1974).
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erations were present, particularly the goal of avoiding discrimi-
nation against foreign parties in a diversity action, and ruled
that because the plaintiff could have brought suit had he moved
to South Carolina, "an accident of residence" should not operate
to his detriment.110 The Fourth Circuit, however, found this ra-
tionale unpersuasive and concluded that Rollins was analogous
not to Szantay but to Bumgarder v. Keene Corp.,10 an action in
federal court in South Carolina against a foreign corporation
brought by a North Carolina plaintiff on injuries sustained in
that state. In Bumgarder, the federal court of appeals refused to
apply the reasoning of Szantay because "there was an alternate
forum to the South Carolina court where Bumgarder could gain
full relief" and held that the action was prohibited by the state's
door-closing statute.110 As in Rollins, the plaintiff in Bumgarder
had commenced his action in South Carolina after the statute of
limitations in his home state had run." Relying on Bumgarder,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rollins determined that
failure "to timely file suit in the more logical, convenient forum
does not constitute a countervailing consideration favoring the
exercise of federal jurisdiction.1 1 2 Consequently, because no
countervailing federal considerations were recognized, the court
of appeals held that the door-closing statute deprived the fed-
eral district court of jurisdiction. 13
In Rollins, the court of appeals confirmed its position that
section 15-5-150 prevents a nonresident plaintiff from bringing a
foreign action in South Carolina'merely to take advantage of the
six-year statute of limitations. Where there is, or has been, an
alternate forum in which the plaintiff could logically and conve-
niently gain full relief, South Carolina's door-closing statute will
prevent the action from being brought in federal or state courts
in South Carolina.
108, See 478 F. Supp. at 1151.
109. 593 F.2d 572 (4th. Cir. 1979).
110. Id. at 572.
111. 634 F.2d at 740 n.2. North Carolina's statute of limitations is codified in N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-52(5)(Supp. 1979).
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V. DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Although failure by a defendant to respond to a complaint
in a proper and timely manner may result in a default judg-
ment,114 South Carolina courts have discretion to grant relief
from default judgments pursuant to section 15-27-130 of the
South Carolina Code.11 5 In Stewart v. Floyd,"", the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court refused to recognize defendant's failure to
respond to a second complaint as excusable neglect even though
the original complaint had been dismissed by an ex parte
order.""
In Stewart, plaintiff brought a malpractice action in Rich-
land County Court against a practicing physician who, upon
receipt of the summons and complaint, forwarded copies to his
attorney and his malpractice insurer. Plaintiff's attorney, upon
114. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-35-310 (1976) provides that:
Judgment may be had, if the defendant fail to answer the complaint, as
follows: In any action on contract the plaintiff may file proof of lawful service
of summons and complaint on one or more of the defendants or of the sum-
mons, according to the provisions of § 15-13-230, and that no appearance, an-
swer or demurrer has been served on him. The clerk shall place all such cases
on the default calendar, and such calendar shall be called the first day of the
term. When the action is on a complaint for the recovery of money only judg-
ment may be given for the plaintiff by default (a)(i) if the demand be liqui-
dated or (ii) if unliquidated and the plaintiff itemize his account, append
thereto an affidavit that it is true and correct and no part of the sum sued for
has been paid by discount or otherwise and a copy be served with the sum-
mons and complaint on the defendant or (b) if the plaintiff prove his claim in
open court, whether itemized or not, in which case the judgment shall be for
the sum sued for as in the case of liquidated demands. In case notice for ap-
pearance in an action has been given by or on behalf of a defendant but no
answer or demurrer has been, or thereafter shall be, served within the time
required by law the plaintiff upon filing proof of such facts shall have his judg-
ment by default against such defendant in the same manner and with like ef-
fect as in cases where no notice of appearance has been given. In all other cases
the relief to be afforded the plaintiff shall be ascertained either by the verdict
of a jury or in cases in chancery by the judge, with or without a reference, as he
may deem proper.
The order for judgment in such cases shall be endorsed upon or attached
to the complaint.
115. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-27-130 (1976) provides inter alia as follows:
The court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as may be just, at any
time within one year after notice thereof relieve a party from a judgment, or-
der or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect and may supply an omission in any proceeding.
116. - S.C. -, 265 S.E.2d 254 (1980).
117. Id. at -, 265 S.E.2d at 256.
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discovering that the damages prayed for far exceeded the county
court's jurisdictional limit, requested opposing counsel's consent
to alteration of the erroneous caption and to filing in the proper
court. Defendant's counsel denied this request, and plaintiffs at-
torney obtained an ex parte order dismissing the action. A copy
of the order was sent to defendant's malpractice insurer. Plain-
tiff then served' 18 defendant with a second summons and com-
plaint that were identical to the previous pleadings except for
the part of the caption designating the forum. Defendant failed
to notify his attorneys of the second service, and, consequently,
made no appearance, answer, or other pleading within the statu-
tory period. Plaintiff filed an affidavit of default,119 and the
court, sitting without jury, rendered a judgment in his favor for
actual and punitive damages totaling $100,000.120
Defendant first moved to vacate the default judgment on
the ground of lack of service. When the trial court denied that
motion, plaintiff next moved to vacate on the ground of excusa-
ble neglect, inadvertence, or surprise, pursuant to section 15-27-
130. Following denial of his second motion, defendant appealed
to the supreme court, 21 and there argued that, because the two
pleadings were very similar, he mistakenly had believed that for-
warding the first to his attorney was sufficient.1 22 The court gave
three reasons for rejecting this argument. First, defendant's tes-
timony concerning his alleged reaction upon service of the sec-
ond set of papers was "diminished" by his continued assertion
that he had no personal recollection of the second service."2"
Second, the court consistently has refused to recognize a defen-
dant's failure to appreciate the importance of pleadings as ex-
cusable neglect.124 Finally, the court concluded that defendant
118. Defendant denied that this service was made; however, the issue was resolved
in a prior action before the lower court. Id. at - n.2, 265 S.E.2d at 255 n.2.
119. See note 114 supra.
120. - S.C. at -, 265 S.E.2d at 255.
121. No appeal was taken from the denial of the motion based on lack of service. -
S.C. at_-, 265 S.E.2d at 255.
122. Id. at , 265 S.E.2d at 255.
123. Id. at -, 265 S.E.2d at 255.
124. DeNault v. Holloway Builders, Inc., 271 S.C. 468, 248 S.E.2d 265 (1978) (no
excusable neglect where defendant failed to attend to a summons and complaint because
he was served with two complaints within the same week and was confused with regard
to the respective dates of service); Thermal Insulation Co. v. Town & Campus, Inc., 271
S.C. 478, 248 S.E.2d 310 (1978)(no excusable neglect where two similar suits were served
[Vol. 33
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was not prejudiced by dismissal of the first suit by ex parte or-
der, and, therefore, that the ex parte order was not the proxi-
mate cause of his failure to give attention to the second set of
pleadings.
125
On previous occasions, the supreme court has ruled that
trial courts have discretion to grant relief from a default judg-
ment when the defendant successfully establishes both excusa-
ble neglect and a meritorious defense to the action.126 The lower
court, in granting relief, must make specific findings of fact,127
and its determination will not be disturbed absent clear abuse of
discretion. 128 Furthermore, the supreme court apparently re-
quires that the act causing the delay be beyond the control of
the defaulting party or his attorney or that it be attributable to
the actions of opposing party or counsel.
29
on the defendants and only one was delivered to the attorney for attention); McInerny v.
Toler, 260 S.C. 382, 196 S.E.2d 122 (1973)(no excusable neglect where, after reading the
complaint, the defendant thought that the plaintiff erroneously and inadvertently
brought the action against him since he assumed that he had no interest in the lease in
question because of his assignment of his interest to his children). The court in Stewart
noted that in these earlier cases there was no evidence of any expectation that the law-
suits against the defendants would be served. In Stewart, however, both appellant's per-
sonal attorney and the attorney for the malpractice insurer were aware that a second
action might be forthcoming. Counsel for the malpractice insurer testified that he called
Dr. Floyd's attorney both after Stewart's attorney requested an amendment to the origi-
nal suit and after he had received a copy of the order of dismissal of the county court
suit. On each occasion, he advised appellants attorney that they might well expect suit
to be brought subsequently in the court of common pleas. - S.C. at - n.3, 265 S.E.2d
at 256 n.3.
125. - S.C. at , 265 S.E.2d at 256. Justice Littlejohn, joined by Justice Gregory,
noted in his dissent that defendant's failure to respond to the second complaint resulted
from error by plaintiff's counsel in designating the wrong court on the first complaint. In
addition, he suggested that the ex parte order, sought without notice to the interested
parties, had been procured improperly. Id. at , 265 S.E.2d at 257. Finally, Justice
Littlejohn asserted that plaintiff was permitted to benefit from his error in bringing the
original action in a court without jurisdiction. Id. at -, 265 S.E.2d at 257.
126. E.g., Mcnerny v. Toler, 260 S.C. 382, 196 S.E.2d 122 (1973). The standard is
the same for granting relief from default before judgment. Commercial Credit Corp. v.
Knight, 272 S.C. 203, 248 S.E.2d 589 (1978)(applying § 15-13-90).
127. E.g., Integon Life Ins. Corp. v. Business Futures Planning Corp., - S.C. -'
266 S.E.2d 81 (1980).
128. E.g., Thermal Insulation Co. v. Town & Campus, Inc., 271 S.C. 478, 248 S.E.2d
310 (1978)(applying § 15-27-130); Simon v. Flowers, 231 S.C. 545, 99 S.E.2d 391
(1957)(applying § 15-13-90).
129. In Tolpa v. Bill Jones Realty, - S.C. -, 270 S.E.2d 622 (1980), the court
affirmed a finding of excusable neglect and set aside a default judgment when respon-
dents were unable to serve responsive pleadings within the statutory period because of
the mandatory evacuation of Hilton Head Island during a hurricane. In Strickland v.
21
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Except in isolated instances, the South Carolina Supreme
Court has been reluctant to find excusable neglect. The policy
behind this approach is clear: a party's delay wastes time and
money and hinders the promotion of swift, efficient adjudica-
tions. Nevertheless, the court also has held that section 15-27-
130 should be construed liberally to see that justice is promoted
and cases are disposed of on their merits.130 Justice can best be
attained when the need for efficiency and economy is balanced
with efforts to dispose of cases on their merits.
David G. Traylor, Jr.
Consol. Energy Prods. Co., - S.C. -, 265 S.E.2d 682 (1980), the court reversed a de-
nial of a motion for extension of time to answer when the delay of respondent'scounsel
in acting on a request for an extension was sufficient to mislead appellants' counsel. The
court noted that it was clear that appellants' counsel had endeavored diligently and in
good faith to serve his client and that, when the request for extension was communi-
cated, respondent's counsel should have been aware of the importance of a prompt reply.
Id. at -, 265 S.E.2d at 684. The court has been particularly willing to find excusable
neglect when possible confusion has resulted from service of a summons without a com-
plaint. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-13-230 (1976) provides:
A copy of the complaint need not be served with the summons, except when
service is made upon a motor vehicle carrier under the provisions of § 15-9-340
or upon a nonresident director of a domestic corporation under the provisions
of § 15-9-430. But if a copy of the complaint be not so served the summons
must state where the complaint is or will be filed, and if the defendant, within
twenty days thereafter, causes notice of appearance to be given and, in person
or by attorney, demands in writing a copy of the complaint, specifying the
place within the State where it may be served, a copy thereof must within
twenty days thereafter be served accordingly. Only one copy of the complaint
need be served on the same attorney.
The court generally has found this procedure so irregular or confusing that it gives rise
to excusable neglect. See Williams v. Carpenter, 273 S.C. 339, 256 S.E.2d 316 (1979);
Thompson v. Wilder, 272 S.C. 563, 253 S.E.2d 108 (1979); Crawford v. Murphy, 260 S.C.
411, 196 S.E.2d 503 (1973); Rochester v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 253 S.C. 147, 169 S.E.2d
387 (1969); Brown v. Weathers, 251 S.C. 67, 160 S.E.2d 133 (1968).
130. Bledsoe v. Metts, 258 S.C. 500, 503-04, 189 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1972); Edwards v.
Ferguson, 254 S.C. 278, 283, 175 S.E.2d 224, 226 (1970).
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